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Abstract
We study low-powered incentives in a model that captures important features of workplaces in
which incentive-pay approaches are minimally relevant. Our motivation is that incentive pay,
while not rare, is clearly far less common than are agency problems; many firms with agency
problems nonetheless pay fixed compensation and offer continued employment to all but those
workers judged “unsatisfactory” according to largely subjective criteria. We find that low-
powered incentives can achieve efficient outcomes in simple workplaces and function
surprisingly well even when the environment is characterized by unobservable performance
heterogeneity and a high degree ofcomplementarity among workers.
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Pittsburgh, PA 15213Economists’ natural inclination in studying employment relationships is to de-
sign incentives. Thus economists have generated a large literature on incentive pay
(recent surveys are Gibbons (1998) and Prendergast (1999)). Yet incentive pay,
while not rare, is clearly far less pervasive than are agency problems; many firms
with agency problems nonetheless pay fixed compensation and offer continued em-
ployment to all but clearly unsatisfactory employees. In this paper we study the
structure of an employment relationship when measures of performance on which
explicit or implicit contracts can be based are either absent or very costly, or where
attempts to exploit them result in highly dysfunctional outcomes. Thus the firm
is limited to “low-powered” incentives: fixed current compensation coupled with
inability to reliably distinguish satisfactory from unsatisfactory workers.
Much of the previous research in this area has pointed to theoretical or empir-
ical failures of incentive-pay schemes of various sorts, but little attention has been
devoted to understanding the strengths and weaknesses of low-powered incentives
per se. In particular, various authors have highlighted the ease with which infor-
mation imperfections can disrupt the proper functioning of incentive-pay schemes.
Holmstrom and Milgrom’s (1994) conclusion captures the flavor of this line of work:
“The use of low-powered incentives within the firm, while sometimes lamented as
one of the major disadvantages of internal organization, is also an important vehicle
for inspiring cooperation and coordination.” Empirically, the incidence of incentive
pay is certainly not particularly high, and its magnitude is typically small relative to
fixed compensation. MacLeod and Parent (1997) document that the compensation
of a largefraction of U.S. workers does not include anysort of incentive pay. Bewley
(forthcoming) found that, although most managers would like to use incentive pay,
niany believe that, for various reasons, they cannot.
Two distinctions are important for understanding the role of low-powered in-
1centives. The first is between objective and subjective assessments of performance.1
In principle, current or future pay can be conditioned on the measures of perfor-
mance chosen by the firm, but the choice of subjective measures imposes additional
constraints. In particular, the nonverifiability of subjective assessments narrows the
set of possible equilibria. On the other hand, the strength of subjective assessments
is that a manager can reasonably determine whether a worker is doing a “good” job
in, say, a multi-tasking environment or where “output” is intangible. Even ifexplicit
performance measurements were available for each task, the combinatorial demands
of optimally balancing them in an explicit contract quickly become overwhelming
(MacLeod and Parent, 1999).
The second distinction is the extent of feedback between performance assess-
ments and compensation; this is what defines “low-powered” incentives. Although,
arguably, virtually every employer connects subjective assessments with payin some
way, the evidence suggests that employers do not differentiate among employees as
sharply as economists might expect. Salary and rating compression is widespread,
for example. There are good reasons for employers’ reluctance to tie pay closely to
subjective assessments: In addition to the problems that plague the use of explicit
performance measurement, influence activities and human biases can easily dampen
or destroy incentives based on subjective assessments.
In this paper, therefore, we study the design of low-powered incentives for
an information structure that captures important features of workplaces in which
incentive-pay approaches are minimally relevant: Either contractible variables ap-
propriate for incentive-pay do not exist, or they result in dysfunctional compensa-
tion schemes that should be avoided. The model we study allows the firm to use
1 Subjective assessments have been formally modeled as common knowledge measure-
ments that cannot be verified by a third party (Baker, 1992; Baker, Gibbons, and
Murphy, 1994). A further distinction can be drawn between common knowledge and
private assessments.
2only one type of information: managers’ impressions or opinions, formed in the
course of performing other duties. We assume these impressions are a costless, but
private and noisy measure of workers’ performance. Since our goal is to understand
the functioning of low-powered incentives, we initially restrict the use of this in-
formation to determining whether to retain a worker. Thus there is no feedback
between the assessments and current or future compensation.
Simpler models of low-powered incentives have been studied in the literature
on deferred compensation and efficiency wages, but these models have been meant
primarily to illustrate features of labor market equilibrium, rather than to illumi-
nate the economics of information flows inside the firm (for example, Lazear, 1979;
Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). Thus, these authors make a number of simplifying as-
sumptions that obscure the operation of low-powered incentives: “Effort” is taken
to be a discrete variable with only one economically viable value. The information
structure of the firm is crude and unrealistic; “monitoring” is an entirely exoge-
nous, costless, and common-knowledge process. The interaction of “effort” and
“monitoring” with the production technology is left in the background.2
The theory we develop is illuminating on several dimensions. First, our basic
formulation with no worker heterogeneity allows us to delineate clearly the role
that performance assessments play in the mechanism of low-powered incentives.
Two striking findings emerge: (1) Despite a rarified information environment, low-
powered incentives achieve efficient outcomes. (2) Only the split of the joint sur-
plus is affected by the quality of performance assessments. Under broad assump-
tions, bad managers—those who are unbiased but unable to evaluate performance
accurately— or difficult information environments are more costly to the firm, but
do not otherwise distort employment relationships. Compensation is higher, but
2 A notable recent exception is Mehta (1998), whose model addresses the relationships
among technology, monitoring, and span of control.
3turnover and performance are not affected.
The introduction of unobservable heterogeneity generates our most interesting
insights. In the spirit of the multi-tasking literature, it seems plausible that workers
often know better than their supervisors how to do their jobs on a day-to-day basis.
Following Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994), werepresent this idea by variation in
the employee’s productivity that is observable only to the employee. Low-powered
employment policies are robust in that they generate outcomes that are close to
optimal when there are small amounts of unobservable heterogeneity.
Most important, with heterogeneity in performance, compensation policies
are not independent of the production technology. Employment policies interact
strongly with the degree of complementarity among workers, and this is one of the
areas in which low-powered employment policies seem to excel. In particular, when
the production technology is characterized by strong complementarity among work-
ers’ performance levels (dubbed “0-ring” technology by Michael Kremer (1993)),
low-powered incentives respond appropriately by inducing close-to-efficient perfor-
mance from low-productivity workers. As complementarity among performance
levels increases, firms find poor performance at the low end more and more un-
desirable. For most parameter values in our model, firms control this downward
variation in performance by raising compensation and, somewhat paradoxically, by
reducing the probability of dismissal for low-productivity workers.
One interpretation of our low-powered incentives is that after the efficient ap-
plication of the various feasible high-powered incentive mechanisms, most firms are
likely to face a residual set of agency issues that can be addressed only through the
use of these low-powered incentives. For instance, limitations on the size of “prizes”
in a rank-order tournament may mean that they cannot completely resolve agency
problems the firm faces. The importance of this residual pool of agency troubles
will vary from firm to firm, depending on the nature of the production technology
4and information flows in the firm. To understand cross-sectional variation, then, it
is necessary to understand how the high- and low-powered incentives interact with
one another and with the technology of production. A simple rank-order tourna-
ment serves as a vehicle to illustrate the principles involved in this interaction. In
the basic model, implementation of higher-powered incentives shifts surplus back
to the firm without interfering with efficiency. In the model with heterogeneity,
matters are more interesting. Higher-powered incentives are relatively ineffective
in boosting performance ofthe least productive workers, the most important group
when there is significant complementarity among workers.
We turn now to the layout of the basic model, which we study in detail in
Section II, deferring consideration of unobservable heterogeneity to Section III. In
Section IV we study the interaction of low- and high-powered incentives (in the
form of a rank-order tournament).
I. THE MODEL
To focus on the functioning of low-powered incentives, we abstract from life-
cycle effects by assuming that workers are infinitely-lived (or, equivalently, face a
Poisson probability ofdeath). Later we introduce a simple rank-order tournament
as a surrogate forthe effects of promotion ladders and other intertemporal arrange-
ments based on subjective assessments. In each period workers choose a scalar
performance level p, known only to the worker.
Theperformance levels ofN workers determine the output ofa profit-maximizing
firm:
Y=G(p1,p2,,..,pN)
with 3C/3p~> 0. We assume that the firm cannot be profitable if all workers
supply p = 0: C(0,. .., 0) = 0. When C is additively separable in pZ the production
function is similar to those used in models of team production such as those formu-
5lated by Bengt Holmstrom (1982).~ Activities such as fruit picking by a team of
agricultural workers would fit this characterization. We are especially interested in
cases where the technology makes workers’ performance levels highly complemen-
tary. Extreme degrees of complementarity generate “0-ring” technology like that
studied by Michael Kremer (1993). A symphony orchestra, for example, fits this
description: No matter how well the other 47 members of an orchestra play, if the
principal second violin plays out of tune, the Mahier is ruined.4
Total output Y is arguably contractible, but, since we are interested in en-
vironments where low-powered incentives prevail, we assume that Y provides no
usable information about p~.We also rule out strategic interactions among work-
ers: Workers do not condition their behavior on the behavior of other workers.
These two assumptions make our information structure quite dissimilar to the team
production problem. Formally, our assumption about the information content of
Y means that we simply do not consider compensation schemes that condition pay
on Y. Informally, we interpret this assumption to mean that either there are no
variables related to a worker’s contribution to firm value on which either an explicit
or implicit contract can be based, or that the firm should not use them because
they would provide dysfunctional incentives for any ofthe various reasons discussed
in the literature.5
Since workers appear identical to the firm, they are treated alike, so we work
~ In team production models, a central focus is the moral hazard from the opportunity
to free-ride. As will be apparent shortly, wedo not addressthis issue, as compensation
in our model is not conditioned on total output.
‘~ Kremer (1993) gives other examples. Kremer and Maskin (1996) discussthe potential
importance of 0-ring production for understanding current labor market trends.
~ Prendergast (1999) notes: “Perhaps the most striking aspect of observed contracts
is that the Informativeness Principle, i.e., that all factors correlated with perfor-




wherep(~)denotes the performance levels of workers other than i. We assume that
g(p) has continuous first and second derivatives and is concave. The concavity of
g(p) is best interpreted in the present context as reflecting complementarity among
workers, but plays no significant role in the model until Section III, where we discuss
it in depth.6
Initially, we assume that performance p changes one-for-one with the worker’s
disutility from work. Interpreting p as an effort level causes no confusion until
Section III, though we prefer the term “performance,” which hints at the range of
problems, such as multi-tasking, that might induce the firm to adopt a low-powered
strategy. A worker’s utility in each period is the wage less her performance level:
w — p. In Section III we introduce random variation in the disutility (“effort”)
required to achieve a given performance level.
Employed workers supply one unit of labor in the period. They have a discount
factor j3 < i.~The expected value of a worker’s alternative activities is Va. Hiring
and termination are costless to the firm.
The firm’s information about the performance level of a particular worker is
minimal: The firm receives a noisy signal (or summary statistic) x of the worker’s
performance,
x = p + .
We assume that e has zero mean, and that its distribution is single-peaked with
density f and distribution function F. We interpret x as a manager’s impression or
6 This isjustthe most interesting interpretation; the technologycould be C(p’, .. . ,p~V)=
g(p’) + ... + g(pN), which displays no interdependence among performance levels,
even if gi sconcave.
~Aconstant exogenous probability of separation would enter the model in a fashion
almost identical to /3.
7opinion of how well the worker is performing. The realization of x is indisputably
private information and, therefore, cannot form the explicit basis for any compen-
sation policy, or is at least suspect in this regard. Rank-order tournaments with a
fixed pooi of “prizes” are the least implausible kind of high-powered scheme in this
environment, and we later examine in some detail how they might function in our
low-information environment. Although x is private information, the distribution
F summarizes characteristics of the manager and production environment that are
common knowledge. A clueless manager has a relatively diffuse distribution for .
We assume the manager behaves in the firm’s interests, though, of course, this is a
subject of considerable independent interest.
Although we focus on an interpretation that ascribes F to the manager, the
nature offirms’ production processes also generates cross-sectional variation in F. If
workers are physically separated from managers, forexample, managers’ impressions
would probably be more diffuse. The span ofa manager’s control, explicitly modeled
by Mehta (1998), would also affect F.
Our information structure differs in an important way from others that use sub-
jective performance evaluation. In particular, Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994)
use a subjective assessment that is the firm’s evaluation of a worker’s contribution
to the firm (y in their paper). In that paper, the subjective assessment is not
contractible, but is common knowledge between the firm and worker, Therefore,
it is possible for the worker to condition a strategy on whether the firm pays an
“implicit-contract bonus” in line with the firm’s subjective assessment; the worker
can easily assess whether the firm has violated the implicit contract. In the present
context, however, the subjective assessment x is not known to the worker, which
effectively makes it impossible to use x to adjust compensation in any useful way
without an extraordinary level of trust. The existence of such trust is likely to be
rare, however, so we examine only equilibria which do not exploit it. Note that if
8compensation were a continuous function of x, the worker would need to be con-
cerned with both large-scale, relatively easy to detect, cheating and minor, difficult
to detect, chiselling.
II. EMPLOYMENT POLICY WITH HOMOGENOUS PERFORMANCE
Since workers do not interact strategically with one another, the model is a
repeated game between the firm and a single worker with the following order of
play in each round: (1) The firm offers a wage w (which is contractible). (2)
The worker responds with a performance level p 0. (3) Nature plays x using
the distribution F. (4) The firm pays w. (5) The firm decides whether to retain
the worker or end the game. We focus on repeated play of the unique Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of this stage game in which the worker is retained if and only if
x exceeds an endogenous threshold. We assume that this threshold ~ is common
knowledge—workers observe the frequency of terminations.
A. The Employee’s Problem
Let j5 be a worker’s best response to an employment policy ~ = {w, ~}that
satisfies the worker’s participation constraint: V(73; ~b)> Va, where V(j~~)is the
maximum utility that can be achieved by accepting ?/J. The lifetime utility of an
employee who chooses performance level p today and reverts to j~i tomorrow is given
by
~ (1)
The employee maximizes V(p; ~)by choosing p> 0. The worker’s best response is
quite well behaved:
Proposition 1: An employment policy ~ = {w, ~}that satisfies the participation
constraint implies a unique best response j3. Further, j3 exceeds the termination
threshold ~.
9Proof: First note that V(p; ‘~b)is continuous in p, and 1imp~,c,V(p; Vt’) = _c~,so
V(p;~)must have a maximum for p> 0.8 Thus for today’s best action to be j3, we
must have V’Q5; ?~) = 0, which reduces to
/3f(~ -~){V(j5;~5) - vai = 1. (2)
We also have
~‘(— ~1T7a T/I~.
— .~ ~ P)~
~p’ ~ 1-/3((1-F(~-~))
which is negative long as f’(~ — p) > 0. Thus V(p;~)is concave where ~ — p < 0.
Therefore, a solution ~3to (2) is a maximum if ~ — ~3 < 0. The maximum is unique,
since two maxima with ~ — j3 < 0 would bracket a minimum. Since ~ is single-
peaked, this is impossible . I
According to Proposition 1, workers are terminated only when their perceived
performance is strictly less than their actual performance. The worker, recognizing
the imperfection of the signal, establishes a buffer between her actual performance,
~, and ~, the perceived performance level that results in termination. Note that this
is a claim about the behavior of the worker in response to any sufficiently desirable
~i/’, not only an equilibrium ~b. Intuition suggests that the buffer increases as the
signal becomes more diffuse. We will show in Proposition 3 that under quite general
assumptions about the distribution of x, that intuition is borne out.
An outsider able to observe both J5 and x might misinterpret outcomes in two
ways. The observer might conclude that managers tolerate substandard perfor-
mance, firing workers only when they see performance well below the norm. Alter-
natively, the observer might interpret j3
— ~ as a “gift” of performance exceeding
some standard or required level, but, in fact there is no reciprocity in this model.
8 An arbitrary ~ might imply the corner solution p = 0. But since C(O, 0,..., 0) = 0,
no operating firm would offer a ‘~/‘that induced this corner solution, so we ignore this
possibility without significant loss of generality.
10Evaluating (1) at p = j3 and solving for V(i3;~),then substituting into (2)
produces
w = ~ + (1- /3)V~+ - ~) (3)
which implicitly defines the worker’s best response j3(i/~). Since w — i~ is the flow of
utility from the job and (1—/3)V~is the flow value of alternative activities, equation
(3) guarantees that any ~ for whichj3> 0 also satisfies the participation constraint.
It is interesting to note that j3 is continuous in ~/‘. In other words, if {w, ~}
is optimal for the firm, a small decrease in w will not result in a discrete jump to
p = 0, as it does in models that assume 0/1 effort decisions.
B. Profit Maximization
The firm’s objective is to maximize profits, which it must do subject to the
constraint imposed by the worker’s best response function ~(~):
maxg(~3(~)) - w.
This problem turns out to be much less cumbersome if we observe that equation
(3) has a dual interpretation as specifying the minimum w required to induce per-
formance j5 for a given ~W e thus write (3) as w = w(~,~)and use it to formulate
an equivalent profit maximization:
rnaxg(j3) -w(~). (4)
:i;,p
We will continue to use j3 to denote the worker’s best response, while using p~to
denote the performance induced by the firm’s optimal choice of ~L’.An interesting
result follows easily from the modified profit-maximization problem (4):
~ That is,
w(~, ~) = min{w subject to (3)}.
11Proposition 2: The performance level p~K induced by the optimal employment
policy ~* in a firm with a homogeneous workforce is first-best:
gi(p*) = 1.
Proof: The first-order conditions for (4) are
0 = g/(p*)+ 3w(p~*)
0— aw(p*,~*)
Since both j~ and ~ are parameters in the minimization implied by the dual inter-
pretation of (3), we can apply the envelope theorem to w(j3,~)(differentiate the
right-hand side of (3)). By inspection,
—1
— — ______
and thus gI(p*) = 1. I
The efficient performance level achieved by low-powered incentives justifies
part of our claim that bad managers do not distort employment relationships when
performance is homogeneous. For awide class ofdensities f(.), including normal, lo-
gistic, and nonstandard t variables, as wellas mixtures ofthem, we can characterize
the equilibrium employment policy in detail.
Proposition 3: Suppose that the density f depends on a parameter a, with a2
linearly related to the variance, and that f can be written
f( ;a)=
where h is differentiable and does not depend on a except via c/a. Then
i. The retention rate does not depend on a. That is, the firm chooses w and ~ so
that (~*— p*)/a = b*, where b* does not depend on a.
ii. Compensation is linearly increasing in a:
w(p*,~*)=p*+(1_/3)Va+ 1_/3F(b*)a (5)
12Proof: Make the change of variables b = y/a, so that
f(ab) =
It is easy to show that
f’(ab) = h’(b)
From profit maximization we have
~_ 3w(p~,~)—1— [1— /3(1 — F(~* p*))]fI(~* _p*)
——
Solving for the retention probability and substituting for f and f’ makes it clear
that the retention probability is independent of a:
Fb* — _F(*_ ~ h(b~)2 ( )= ~x p~— / *
Substitution into (3) produces equation (5). I
Combined with Proposition 2, this result demonstrates that bad managers or
difficult environments make it costly to achieve efficient performance. One might
expect that in an increasingly noisy environment the firm would respond by trading
off lower expected performance for lower compensation. Instead, increasing a only
moves the worker farther away from her participation constraint (while a = 0
makes the participation constraint bind). The mechanism works in the following
way: Higher a reduces the value ofthe job to the worker because the probability of
termination is higher. The parties respond by increasing the spread between p and
~ (returning the probability of termination to its original level) and by increasing
the wage (directly increasing V(p; ‘~/‘)). This is, however, the only distortion that
results; the performance level not affected. As in the standard principal-agent
problem, where a linear contract usually has a negative intercept, some sort of
lump-sum transfer is needed if the firm is to force the worker onto her participation
constraint.
13III. Low-POWERED INCENTIVES WITH UNOBSERVABLE HETEROGENEITY
We turn next to the most important contribution of our paper—the study
of low-powered incentives in a firm confronted with unobservable worker hetero-
geneity. Though we do not model it here, there is one obvious reason why the our
low-powered incentive structure, which relies on firing workers with particularly low
observed performance, will be effective in dealing with heterogeneity: the turnover
acts as a device to filter permanent, unobservable heterogeneity. Low ability work-
ers, for example, will make systematically different choices or get systematically
different outcomes for the same choices, thus changing their probability of sur-
viving the ~ screen. Explicit modeling of that phenomenon would require careful
attention to the process by which the firm learns about a given worker through a
series of draws on x.
In this section we focus instead on the implications of a more subtle form
of unobservable heterogeneity—transitory variation in the work environment. If
workers are better positioned than supervisors to observe these stochastic elements
in the production process, then the motivational effect of anyincentive schemethat
relies on the supervisor’s assessment will vary unobservably with circumstances. As
we demonstrate shortly, this in turn implies that employment policies interact in
important and systematic ways with the nature of the production technology itself.
A. A Simple Model of Heterogeneity
Following Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994), suppose that the effort required
to achieve a given level of performance is random, so that the worker’s performance
is p = e/m~,where e is effort—the disutility incurred in supplying performance p.
The random variable m~ is binary with T/i > “72, Pr {m~== 0, and E{m1} = 1.
We will see that higher performance is associated with lower marginal disutility
‘172. Each realization of ‘1] is independent of past realizations and those of other
14workers. We assume that ‘17 is known only to the worker and thus not contractible.
We continue to assume that x = p+ and output is g(p). However, we now have
g(p~) = E{C(p~,p~)}, (6)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the (binomial) distribution of other
workers’ productivity realizations, that is, ~ As in Section II, the problem we
solve should be understood as designing the employment policy ~L’ that should be
offered to worker i holding other workers’ performance at the levels, p~and p~,
induced by the optimal policy ,,~b*.
We first consider the worker’s best response to employment conditions ~. The
expected lifetime utility of a worker faced with ‘1Jj is
V(p~,77~,i~) = w ~77jPj +q/3Va +/3[F(~_p~)Va+ (1— F(~—pj))E~{V}, (7)
where E~{V} = 0V(j~1, ‘rfl, ‘~)+ (1 — 0)VQ32, ‘172, ‘~L’). The first-order condition for
maximizing V with respect to Pj is
= /7[Ev{V} - V~If(~ - j3~). (8)
The structure of the employee’s maximization is much the same as in the simpler
model, and thus Proposition 1 applies to both j3~and P2. Taking expectations of
both sides of (7) with respect to ‘17 gives an expression for E~{V(j3, ‘17; ~/‘)}that can
be used in (8). Rearrangement produces
w = 977i15i + (1 — 0)772~32+ (1 —
+ 1-/3[1-0F(~-~1)-(1-0)F(~-~2)] ( flj (9) /3
forj = 1, 2. Equations (9) implicitly define the worker’s best responses ~ and P2
to employment policy i/’. Note that equations (9) imply
f(~—i5i)rii (10
f(~-~32) 7)2
15We digress briefly to state the characteristics of the best-response functions,
which offer some intuition forthe pattern ofnumerical results we observe and discuss
below.
Proposition 4: For all ~ that satisfy the worker’s participation constraint, the
worker’s best-response functions obey:
1 — 3Pi 3Pi 1 — 3P2 3P2
Suppose f(~ — p2)/f(x — P1) is increasing in i~(that is, f possesses the monotone
likelihood ratio property), then at the profit-maximizing employment policy, ~b* ,1o
3Pi 1 3I~i ~ 3192 3192 > i~ U, > %.J, — >
3w dx 3w dx
Sketch of Proof: The proof is long, so we outline it only. The first part comes from
straightforward differentiation and manipulation of equations (9). There are three
steps in proving the second part. First, profits are Og(j31(~, w)) +(1 —0)g(~32(~, w)) —
w. The first-order condition for ~ implies that 3j5~/3~ and 31~2/3x have opposite
signs. Second, the first part ofthe proposition implies that either 3j31/Dw or 3p2/3w
is greater than 1, while the other is less than one. Third, differentiating (10) with
respect to w gives a relationship between these two derivatives, and the monotone
likelihood ratio property is sufficient to guarantee 0j3~/3w> 3j~2/0w.I
The central ideas of Proposition 4 are sensible. The first two equalities estab-
lish that the firm can always increase performance by some specific amount, say
L~.Pjby simply effecting identical corresponding increases in the wage and dismissal
threshold, ~w == /~p3.The change in w compensates the worker for the
10 The monotone likelihood ratio assumption is frequently invoked in agency theory.
Distributions in this class have the property that higher signals are always relatively
more likely to have come from the distribution with the higher mean. For details,
see Milgrom (1981). Many of the distributions that satisfy the hypotheses of Propo-
sition 3 also possess the monotone likelihood ratio property, for example, the normal
and logistic distributions. However, not all such distributions display the monotone
likelihood ratio property over all possible values.
16additional disutility incurred, and the change in ~ exactly restores the probability
of termination to its old value. The derivatives ofpi with respect to the wage are
both, not surprisingly, positive. The derivatives with respect to ä~are more inter-
esting. With homogenous performance, the firm, for any given w, adjusts t so asto
maximize performance: 3p/3~= 0. Here the firm chooses a compromise, ~,which
is “too high” from the perspective of achieving the highest possible P1 and “too
low” from the perspective of achieving maximum P2~
B. Low-Powered Incentives Are Robust
The firm chooses ‘~J to maximize OgQ3i) + (1 — O)g(i3~) — w subject to equations
(9). Reasoning similar to that leading to Proposition 2, gives us a rather interesting
generalization of Proposition 2:
Proposition 5:
Og’(pfl+(1—0)g’(p)=077i+(1—0)772=1. (11)
The proof can be foundin an appendix. Note that, combined with (10), Propo-
sition 5 implies that p~< 1 <p~.Proposition 5 looks innocuous, but in fact demon-
strates the robustness of low-powered incentives on three levels. First, equation (11)
shows that Proposition 2 is robust to infrequent heterogeneity. If 0 is low so that
‘17 = ‘171 is a rare event, the low-powered incentive mechanism pushes incentives to-
ward efficiency when the common event occurs; if 0 is small, (11) cannot hold unless
g/(p~)~ 772.
Second, low-powered incentives will be robust to small amounts of heterogeneity
(771/772 1). Since f(S) is continuous and ~ — p~and ~ — p~are to the left of the
single peak of f(’), equation (10) implies that p~~ p~.Combined with (11) this
means that p~~ p~~ 1; small amounts of unobservable heterogeneity do not result
in grossly dysfunctional behavior.
17Third, and most interesting, suppose we normalize performance so that g(1) =
g’(l) = 1 and then make g progressively more concave while keeping g(1) = g”(l) =
1.11 (In the limit g(.) has a corner at 1.) In the present context, increasing concavity
of g(’) is most naturally interpreted as increasing complementarity among workers’
performance levels; more concavity moves g(p) closer to 0-ring technology. To illus-
trate, suppose that C(.) is a constant-elasticity-of-substitution function. Ignoring
the expectation in (6) (which is just the sum of functions with the this shape) and,
for simplicity, assuming that all other workers work at performance level ~ = 1,
we have g(p) = C(p,~,. . .,~) = A[pa + (n — 1)~]~.The concavity of g(p) can be
increased in the way specified above by moving the elasticity parameter a toward
—oc, while changing A to keep the scale from changing at p == 1.
As g becomes more concave in this sense, the efficient level of Pi converges
to 1. Proposition 5 implies that the actual level of Pi also converges to 1. If it
did not, Og’(p1) would exceed 1. In other words, low-powered incentives respond
appropriately to the gross inefficiency that would come from allowing performance
to drop too far as C(.) approaches an “0-ring” technology.
In terms of concavity, Proposition 5 gives only a limiting result. A stronger
property can be proven, if we are more precise about the kind of deformation of g
we have in mind. Let ‘i/p = {~*,w*} be the optimal employment policy when the
production function is g(p). We will say that a production function ~(p) is “closer
to 0-ring” or “more concave around 1” than g(p) if four conditions hold:
(i) ~(1) = ~‘(i) = g(1) = g/(~) =1,
(ii) ~(p) > g’(p) for p < 1,
(iii) ~(p) <g’(p) for p> 1,
~W e hold scale fixed in order to isolate the effects of concavity. The exact point at
which we do so is somewhat arbitrary, though 1 is a natural choice because E{’q} = 1
andp~<1 <p~.
18(iv) 0~~(pi) + (1— O)~’(P2) > 1. (12)
Inequality (12) says that changing the production function to ~ without adjusting
causes (11) to be violated in a particular direction. Our definition is complicated,
but intuitive: What we have in mind is simplythat the firm becomes more averse to
downward variation in performance, while upward variation confers less advantage.
That is, the production function bends down more for p < 1 than for p > 1.12
Figure 1 illustrates the effects of increasing concavity in this way.
The intuition that Proposition 5 suggests about the robustness of low-powered
incentives when there is significant complementarity among workers is borne out in
our next result:
Proposition 6: Suppose that g~(p)closer to 0-ring than g(p). Then ~i > P1.
The proof can be found in the appendix. Proposition 6 demonstrates that a
firm whose technology is closer to 0-ring responds appropriately to that fact when
using low-powered incentives. Together, Propositions 4 and 6 allow us to understand
how variations in worker complementarity across firms can matter for the structure
of low-powered incentives. As a thought experiment, consider a firm that wishes to
increase its initial optimal p~,while at the same time becomes less concerned about
p~. (This would a firm’s response, for example, to a marginal shift toward 0-ring
technology.) Proposition 4 tells us that one way to achieve the desired increase in P1
would be to simply increase w and ~ by an equal amount. However, since i~ is always
“too high” from the perspective of optimizing P1, a more clever solution would use
a smaller increase in w, accompanied by a decrease (or perhaps a relatively small
increase) in i~.
12 The last piece of our definition, inequality (12), is partly endogenous in the sense
that “increasing concavity” depends on where you start. Avoiding this requires a
more restrictive definition, for example changing g(p) only for p < 1. Also, 0 enters
because very low 0 will make the effect of increasing the marginal product of 771
workers unimportant.
19In fact, this is the pattern we observe in numerical experiments with the model:
Changing the technology toward 0-ring, usually increases the equilibrium value of
w and decreases that of ~, though when 0 is high ~ increases. With o-ring-like
technology, it is critical that the performance of the lowest-performing agent be
sufficiently high. Low-powered incentives generate this outcome by using relatively
high wages, but, surprisingly, these are typically paired with relatively low dismissal
thresholds.
We have been unable to rule out analytically the possibility that both w and
~ decline under the increasing complementarity scenario, but in numerical experi-
ments we have been unable to find this outcome. (Proposition 6 rules out the pos-
sibility that w is lower and ~ higher.) Thus the results shown in Figure 1 appear to
be representative. The low-powered incentive mechanism responds to greater corn-
plementarity among workers by inducing better performance from low-productivity
workers, simultaneously over-engineering incentives for high-productivity workers.
C. Other Specifications of Unobservable Heterogeneity
Brief consideration of two variations on our assumption about where the un-
observable heterogeneity appears in the model is informative. Suppose first that
‘q affects output, but not utility, so that output is r~g(p)and flow utility is w — p.
Again, i7 is known only to the worker. (Recall our assumption that an individual
worker’s output cannot be isolated, so the firm has no usable information, con-
tractible or otherwise, on 77g(p).) We continue to assume x = p+ . This model
is relatively easy to analyze. The worker’s best-response function is identical to
the model with homogeneous workers because g does not have any influence on the
worker’s incentives. Thus ~ = p2; although workers see high and low marginal
product days, they do not respond to this information.
Our second alternative model is identical to the first, except that we assume the
20firm has information about output, rather than effort: x = ~jg(p)+ . (It is almost
impossible to interpret this assumption in the context of a multi-worker firm unless
C(p’,. ..,p”~)is additively separable in p1,. . , ,pN, but the analysis is somewhat
informative, nonetheless.) The signal xi sstill only a manager’s impression and
not contractible. Since ~/is not observed by the firm, it cannot set state-dependent
values of ~. Since utility is linear in effort, the worker will choose effort levels to
makethe probability oftermination constant across states. Thus ‘17~g(pi)= ‘172g(p2).
In the first alternative model, low-powered incentives cannot induce the worker
to vary p to take advantage of high-productivity states. When the firm monitors
output, however, the situation is far worse. Effort is negatively correlated with
productivity. A high value of ~/shifts the mean of x upward, making the probability
of termination too low from the worker’s point of view, relative to the constant
marginal utility of reduced effort.
IV. RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENTS
The information available to agents in our model makes the use of most types of
incentive pay implausible. As we have mentioned, since x is entirely subjective and
not observable to the worker, a compensation scheme based directly on x would
be easily manipulated by the employer. However, Malcomson (1984) and others
have observed that rank-order tournaments with preannounced prizes, may have a
critical advantage when the employer is tempted by this form of moral hazard. If
the employer can credibly commit to awarding a fixed amount of prize money, and
workers have some assurance that influence activities will not distort rankings,’3
they may be willing to respond favorably to a rank-order tournament. In this
13 Prendergast and Topel (1996) have argued that influence activity discourages the
use of incentive pay. Also, Lazear (1989) has noted that when cooperation among
workers is important, salary compression (that is, movement toward lower-powered
incentives) is optimal.
21sense a tournament is the incentive-pay scheme that is closest to our low-powered
incentives.
In this section we introduce atournament similar to those described by Lazear
and Rosen (1981). Our objective is to study how this type of high-powered incentive
interacts with low-powered incentives in our low-information environment.
We begin by reinstating the assumption that workers supply homogeneous per-
formance. Suppose there are just two workers. The tournament pays wage wH to
the worker with the higher realization of x, and wL <wH to the other worker. We
assume that the firm can commit to paying out wH +wL, so average compensation
is known to be 11J = (wH + wL)/2. The firm continues to terminate workers when
x falls below a threshold ~,so ‘~b= {wH, wL, ~}. Finally, we assume a symmetric
Nash equilibrium of the game between the two workers, so they supply the same p.
Letting superscript a or b denote the worker, the value to worker a of supplying
performance level p today and the optimal level ~3tomorrow is
V(p; ~)= WHPr {xa > x6} + wL[1 — Pr {xa > x6}} —
+/3[F(~_p)Va+ (1-F(~-p))V(j3;~)].
Pr {xa > xb} can be written in a more useful form:
Pr {xa > x6} = Pr {pa + ~a > + b} = Pr{~ > + — pa}
=fPr{ a >pb+ bpa~ b}f( b)d b
= f[1 — F(pb — pa + b)]f( b)db
The worker’s best response must satisfy V’(13;~)= 0. Since P2 = ~ in a symmetric
equilibrium,
3p f a~ 61 too r 1x _— x ~ = ~, f( b)2d 6
3~a J
I, -oo
and the first-order condition can be written as
(wH - wL) f(~b)2db+ /3f(~ - ~)[V(j~~)- Va] =1.
22Substituting for V(j5; i,5) gives
~=~+(1_/3)Va+ [1_(wH_wL)ff( b)2d b] , (13)
which, like (3), implicitly defines the best response ~3(~). In the absence of the
“prize,” (wH—wL), equation (13) reduces to (3). The mechanics ofprofit maximiza-
tion are much the same as with low-powered incentives. In particular, g~~(p*) = 1.
Not surprisingly, then, if the tournament can be implemented, it does not interfere
with efficiency.
If f(.) is of the form assumed in Proposition 3, the fraction on the right-hand
side of (13) does not depend on a and we have
~ =~+ (1 _/3)Va + 1 ~*) [a_ (wH _wL)fh(b)2db]. (14)
The first thing to note about (14) is that, in principle, the tournament does
work in this environment; a “prize” of wH — wL helps lower average compensation.
Indeed, as in Lazear and Rosen (1981), if wH — wL can be made large enough, the
worker can be pushed onto her participation constraint (that is, ~ = ~5+(1 —/3)V°~.
In fact, though the specifics ofour model are quite different than Lazear and Rosen’s,
assuming normality and setting the bracketed term in (14) to zero (pushing the
worker onto her participation constraint) gives wH—wL = 2\/~a,which is equivalent
to Lazear and Rosen’s result under normality.’4
The second thing to note about (14) is that to the extent there is a residual
agency problem, low-powered incentives work on top of the high-powered incentives
14 Equation (14) shows that the size of the tournament “prize” (wH — wL) needed to
move the worker to her participation constraint, depends not only on the variance
of the manager’s signal, but also on higher moments through the term f h(b)2db.
For example, if x has a normal distribution, the prize needs to be 7.1 percent higher
than with a logistic distribution having the same variance. Note that the logistic
distribution has higher kurtosis than the normal distribution, with more variation
appearing in the form of signals far away from the mean.
23in exactly the same way we have outlined in previous sections; only the level of com-
pensation changes. Neither the performance level nor the turnover rate is affected
by the presence of the tournament. The equilibrium of the model is exactly the
same as it would have been using low-powered incentives alone but with a variance
equal to the bracketed term in (14).
It is easy to see exactly how well known constraints on tournaments work imi
our low-information environment. A bad manager (or, more accurately, workers’
perception that the manager is bad), or a difficult environment, may mean that a
is so high that it is impossible to achieve a large enough gap between wH and wL.
Alternatively, influence activities may limit the feasible size of the prize.
The advantages of low-powered incentives that we demonstrated in Section III
are reinforced by considering the interaction of unobserved heterogeneity with the
tournament. Recall that when there is significant complementarity among workers’
performance levels, optimal low-powered incentives discourage downward variation
in performance. It turns out that rank-order tournaments are likely to be inef-
fective, and possibly counterproductive, when faced with this kind heterogeneity.
Intuitively, tournaments are ineffective in an 0-ring environment for the following
reason. A worker who gets a bad draw (7/i) realizes that at least one other worker is
likely to have gotten a good draw, so she is ata big disadvantage in the tournament.
Therefore the prize provides little, if any, motivation. Why expend extra effort to
win the tournament when you know the deck is already stacked against you? With
0-ring production, the firm is most interested in motivating the workers with bad
draws. Yet the tournament provides the strongest motivation to workers with good
draws—workers for whom the marginal value of effort is near zero.
To illustrate this mechanism more precisely, consider the problem from the
perspective of the worker a. Once she draws 7/3, the value of supplying performance
24Pi today and the optimal levels j5i and P2 in the future is
V(pi;~)= wHPr {xa > xb} + wL[1 — Pr {xa > x6}] —
+ /3[F(~_p~)Va+ (1_ F(~-
The first-order conditions for maximizing V are:
OPr {xa > x6}
f(~ — ~i)/3[Ev{V} — Va] + [wH — wLI = 7/i
191 (15)
OPr{xa > xb}
+ 0P2 [wH WL] 7/2~
Note that the bracketed terms in (15) do not depend on the realization of 17. The
first term on the left side ofeach equation is the effect ofmarginal effort on retaining
a valuable job times the value of the job. The second term is the effect of marginal
effort on the probability of winning the tournament times the prize. The sum of
these two terms must equal the disutility of marginal effort.
Now consider the effects of introducing a small tournament, without changing
either average compensation or ~. Holding j~,and P2 fixed, the value of the job is
unaffected by this tournament. If 0 < 1/2, it is possible to show that
OPr{xa > xb} dPr{xa > xb}
3P1 0192
In other words, worker a believes the marginal effect of effort on winning is relatively
small when she herself has drawn ‘i7, if it is unlikely that worker b has also drawn
~,. That is, she does not expect effort to significantly enhance her prospects of
winning if she is unlikely to be playing in a fair tournament. In asetting with more
than two workers, the probability that a plays against only ‘1]i workers is even lower.
Considering only the marginal effect of effort on winning, then, a small prize will
cause worker at oraise P2 more than 191. Increasing the performance levels, however,
reduces E~{V},so the tournament has a demotivating effect via the first term on
the left side for either 771 or “72W Since f(~1i —p1) > f(’f —p2) this demotivating effect
will be greater when ‘q =
25The tournament is ineffective in motivating ~/1 workers partly because win-
ning is an event that occurs only in the tail of the distribution, where changes in
performance will not significantly affect the overall probability of winning. This
argument is most compelling with a large number of workers and a concentrated
prize structure (only one winner). The problem can be mitigated by reducing the
concentration and size of the prizes. But in order to structure the tournament so
that a bad m~does not significantly disadvantage the worker, the prize would have to
be substantially diluted (for example, prizes for the top 15 workers in a 20 person
firm), reducing the overall incentive effect.
This leads to another useful way to understand low-powered incentives. An o-
ring firm with heterogeneous performance needs to focus on motivating the bottom
of the performance distribution. This is where a tournament with a concentrated
prize structure is least desirable. Low-powered incentives ofthe type westudy in this
paper are, in effect, an inverted tournament in which virtually everyone is a winner.
The only losers are those with very low subjective performance evaluation (x < ii).
The logic is a mirror image of our analysis of a rank-order tournament (except that
the firm fires a random rather than fixed number of workers). The prospect of
losing their job has little effect on the ‘172 workers; by drawing 7/2 the deck is stacked
against this outcome. In contrast, the “ii workers realize that they can substantially
affect the probability of avoiding this negative prize by supplying higher effort.
Thus the low-powered scheme provides a relatively high level of motivation for 77,
workers with poor draws, while only minimally distorting the already acceptable
performance levels of ‘172 workers.
26V. CONCLUSION
The arrangements employers typically reach with their workforce look quite
different than incentive contracts derived by economic theorists. Many employees
are hired with an implicit understanding that they will be offered a fixed level
of compensation, along with continued employment, so long as their performance
appears to exceed some minimal threshold. Thus Prendergast (1999) argues, “A
critical avenue for future research should be to better understand the evaluation
and compensation of those with non-contracted output.”
These empirical observations motivate us to study low-powered incentives. In
particular, we construct an environment in which the manager has a signal that
serves as a subjective (private) summary statistic of the worker’s performance. A
subjective evaluation, based on human observation, has the advantage that it can ex-
tract information that is difficult to explicitly define or even articulate—politeness,
enthusiasm, or cooperativeness—but which can be nonetheless be informally as-
sessed by an observant manager. Obviously, firms cannot easily use such a signal
as the basis of an incentive contract, but the signal can be used by the manager for
making retention decisions.
Our theory provides a parsimonious characterization of compensation, perfor-
mance, and turnover policy for a firm that uses low-powered incentives to solve
agency problems. In the simplest version of our model, optimal low-powered incen-
tives always induce the efficient performance level from employees. The retention
rate does not depend on the dispersion of the firm’s signal about worker perfor-
mance, but compensation is linearly increasing in the variance. Motivation from
our low-powered incentive stems from workers’ desire to retain valuable jobs; the
participation constraint is not typically binding. An explicit incentive, in the form
of a rank-order tournament, may be particularly difficult to implement in an envi-
ronment in which decisions are based solely on signals that are private information.
27We find, though, that if the firm can implement such higher-powered incentives,
they move workers closer to the participation constraint (with the residual agency
problem solved by low-powered incentives).
Our most interesting results derive from a version of the model in which we
assume that there is unobservable variation in the effort workers must supply to
achieve a particular level of performance. In this instance, the efficiency of any
incentive scheme hinges crucially on the extent to which there is complementarity
inthe performance level of the firm’s workers. Extreme complementarity—Kremer’s
0-ring technology—implies that the value of the firm’s output varies significantly
with the poorest performance in the workforce. Low-powered incentives of the
form we study fare especially well in this environment, because they operate so as
to effectively motivate workers who would otherwise be most inclined to provide
the lowest performance. Higher-powered incentives tend to squander resources on
incentives that induce excess performance from workers already inclined to perform
at high levels.
In most work environments, low-powered incentives have two further advan-
tages (which we do not model in this paper) that doubtless tend to reinforce their
use. First, if there is persistent heterogeneity in the quality of workers, the use
of layoffs for particularly poor observed performance will tend to weed out poor
workers. In this sense, the layoffs are doing double duty as an incentive device and
a means of screening. Second, when low-powered incentives are used, workers who
are penalized for poor performance will no longer be with the firm. Bewley (forth-
coming) found that managers often defend their use of layoffs by noting that this
“ships out” workers who would otherwise have the lowest morale. Understanding
these two facets of a low-powered incentives policy would, minimally, require careful
treatment of persistent heterogeneity and the attendant statistical learning issues.
Our work here persuades us that additional research on these lines might well
28be fruitful. We believe, in particular, that research focusing on the interaction of
incentives and the nature of the production technology holds promise for further
theoretical development, and ultimately empirical testing.
29Appendix
PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS 5 AND 6
Proposition 5:
0g’(p~)+ (1 — 0)g’(p~) = 07/, + (1 — 0)7/2 = 1. (11)
Proof: The firm’s profit maximization is
max0g(pi) + (1 — O)g(p2) —
subject to equations (9). Note that (10) defines P2 = P2(p1, i~) with
3p2(pi,x) — 1 0p2(pi,x) 16
3l~, —— 3~ , ()
which shortly proves convenient. Thus
w(~i,~)= 07/i~i+ (1 — O)7/2p2(~1,~)+ (1 —
~ ( 7~ ~ (17)
/3
defines the minimum w required to induce performance levels i~,and P2(73i, i~) for a
given ii (aswell as implicitly giving the best-response function 75,(’i/)). An equivalent
profit maximization is, therefore,
max 0g(~i)+ (1- 0)g(p2(~,~))- w(h, ~).
The first-order conditions are
00g’(p~) ~(1_0)gI (p2(p ~))0P2~x) — ______
0= (~_~)g/ (p2(p~*))OP2(P1~X) - Ow(p*f) Pi
Applying the envelope theorem, as in the proof of Proposition 2, and using (16), we
find that
0w(pi,~) 0w(p,,~)=07/,+(10)7/2=1.
Proposition 5 follows from adding the two first-order conditions. I
30Proposition 6: Suppose that g~(p)is closer to 0-ring than g(p). Then ~5~i > pi.
Proof: Suppose instead that ~i ~ P1. This does not restore (11), that is,
0~(pi)+ (1- 0)g~(P2)>1.
Therefore, if ~i ~ P1, then P2 > P2~ Let ~* and ‘1J* be the optimal employment
policies for production functions g and ~,respectively. Let H(~)and H(’l~b)denote
the profit functions in these two cases. Since the worker’s best-response functions do
not depend on g in any way, the firm can elicit performance levels ~i = P1(~*)and
P2 = p2(’4~) when the production function is g and P1 = p,(~*) and P2 = p2(~)
when the production function is ~. By assumption we have
fl(~*)ll(~*)>o
fl(~*) - ll(~*)>0.
Adding these inequalities yields
fl(~*)- H(~*)+H(~*)- H(~*)>0.
With some rearranging this inequality becomes
- [~(~fl-~)])
+ (1- 0)([g~(p~) - ~(p~)] - [g(~) - g(p~)])>0
Given ~‘i <P1 and P2 > P2, each bracketed term is positive. Under our assumptions
about the relationship between g and ~,however,
g(pfl — g(~)<~(p~) — ~) and ~) — ~(p~) <g(~) — g(p;),
producing a contradiction. I
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